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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following question is presented for review: 
Is it the intent of the language of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract to award a prevailing party reasonable attorneyfs fees 
necessary to defend an action brought upon the contract terms, 
where the defense enforces the contract and is based on proof of 
no default? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was made upon its own 
motion pursuant to the provisions for expedited proceedings under 
Rule 31. Accordingly, no written decision was provided* The 
decision of the trial court was affirmed. 
JURISDICTION 
The appellants seek a grant of a Writ of Certiorari under 
the provision of Section 78-2-2 Utah Code Annotated which 
provides for review of the decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and under the provisions of Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The gr^nt of certiorari is sought and governed by Rules 45 
and 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The underlying 
dispute is a question of contract law and does not require 
interpretation of any Utah Statutes. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Nelson was the prevailing party in a law suit 
brought by the respondents claiming breach of contract. The 
breach of contract related to a claim that specific written 
warranties against water problems in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract had been made and had been breached. The jury 
determined that the contract had not been breached by Nelson. 
The appellant sought attorney's fees for defending the suit. The 
trial court denied the request for attorney's fees on the grounds 
that the contract language precluded such an award where there 
was not a finding of default. The court specifically found that 
the contract language would only allow an award of attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party in the event of default and that in 
this case the prevailing party had prevailed by proving that 
there was no default and therefore the contractual language did 
not apply. 
ARGUMENT 
The appellant argues that a broader meaning should be given 
to the attorney's fees provision of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. The broader interpretation should provide for recovery 
of attorney's fees for successful defending against a claim of 
default where the successful party seeks to enforce the contract. 
This interpretation is more consistent with the entire language 
of the paragraph and gives full meaning to the words "prevailing 
party" and furthermore upholds the implicit understanding of the 
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parties. Such decision is believed by the appellant to be 
consistent with prior case law and promotes sound public policy. 
The Supreme Court should grant this petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari for the following reasons: 
1. The case involves an important issue of public policy. 
The many contracts within the State of Utah are written with this 
or similar contracts which are prepared by the Department of 
Business Regulation for the use of the public. Ambiguities in 
the application of such language should be resolved by the 
Supreme Court for the benefit of the public. The current 
U.R.E.C. language and current statutes do not resolve the 
inherent question of interpretation. 
2. This ruling of the Court of Appeals is contrary to the 
ruling in Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate Investment Co. , 3 Utah 
2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955) which petitioner argues is 
controlling in this case. The Supreme Court should resolve the 
conflicting statements of law as contained in Swain, supra, and 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986). In 
Swain, supra, there was no default, the prevailing party enforced 
a similar contract and attorney's fees were awarded. In 
Faulkner * supra, a later case involving different language the 
court denied attorney's fees and in dicta appears to require a 
default for attorney's fees. 
3. The Supreme Court in the decision of Quealy v. 
Anderson, 27 Utah Adv. Rep 24 (Utah 1988) has indicated a 
divergence of opinion between Chief Justice Hall, Justice 
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Zimmerman and the other Justices of this court pertaining to the 
right of a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees under such 
circumstances. This case provides an opportunity for the court 
to partially resolve differences of opinion and to give guidance 
to the attorneys and public practicing in the State of Utah. The 
grant of a Writ of Certiorari would allow the court to examine 
the issue of attorney's fees under similar but less difficult 
circumstances than those presented in Quealy, supra. 
The petitioner believes that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals was in error and relies on the brief filed with the Court 
of Appeals which is attached hereto as an Addendum, in support of 
the position of petitioners relative to the underlying question 
of law, as to the interpretation of the contractual language 
under the circumstances of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Certiorari should be granted in order to clarify the law 
relative to the right to recover attorney's fees by the 
prevailing party under the Uniform Real Estate Contract in 
instances where prevailing defends by proving they are not in 
default. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //^day of ^ ^ ^ r - 1989. 
^ ^ ^ rmv 
Steven F. Alder 
Attorney for Respondent 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisd ic t ion of th i s appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals i s 
by virtue of the authority of the Utah Supreme Court to transfer 
c a s e s to the Court of Appeals for d i s p o s i t i o n . Appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court was o r i g i n a l l y predicated on a p p e l l a n t ' s 
r i g h t s under S e c t i o n 3 Art i c l e 8 of the Utah Constitution and 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-3 ( 2 ) ( j ) . 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent Lochheads sued a p p e l l a n t Geraldine Nelson 
c l a i m i n g b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t / b r e a c h of w a r r a n t y , and 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n amounting to fraud and seeking ac tua l and 
p u n i t i v e damages. These claims were based on finding leaks in 
the basement f loor of the residence purchased by Lochheads from 
Mrs. Nelson on a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
The appel lant , Nelson, counterclaimed for breach of contract 
a l l e g i n g nonpayment of taxes and seeking at torney's fees for 
breach and for defending the Lochheads' c la ims. 
At the c o n c l u s i o n of Lochheads c a s e , the court granted 
Nelson's motion to dismiss claims of misrepresentation and fraud 
and c la ims for p u n i t i v e damages. The jury denied Lochheads' 
claim of breach of contract and breach of warranty. Pursuant to 
s t i p u l a t i o n of the part i e s Nelson's counterclaim for nonpayment 
of taxes was submitted to the court . The court granted Nelson 
judgment on her counterclaim in the amount of $739.56. 
The issue of Nelson's claim for attorney's fees was reserved 
for a hearing after the t r i a l . The court denied Nelson's claim 
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for a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s incurred in the defense of the Lochheads' 
s u i t for breach of contract and only awarded fees incurred in the 
prosecution of the counterclaim for unpaid taxes* Nelson appeals 
from t h i s order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Does the language of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
preclude the recovery of attorney's fees incurred in defending an 
action brought for breach of contract, if the defending party 
prevails by demonstrating that no breach occurred* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(FACTS) 
Lochheads entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (UREC) 
to buy Nelson's house on about October 31/ 1983. After the 
closing , the Nelsons agreed to continue to Jive in the home 
paying rent to the Lochheads until the Lochheads sold their home 
ox ui\til August SI, 19&4. ^See Uniform Real Estate Contract* 
Addendum 1.) 
Prior to the sale to the Lochheads, the tochheads visited 
the home on several occasions. During these visits and prior to 
October 31, 1983, Lochheads inquired about a water puddle in the 
backyard. The Nelsons discussed this puddle and also told the 
Lochheads about past water problems caused by runoff water coming 
into the basement through the windows. 
The appellant Nelson testified that she never had any water 
percolate into the basement through the floor while she lived in 
the home. She also testified that she had disclosed to the 
Lochheads all water problems and that all past problems had been 
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correc ted at the time of the s a l e . (Transcript has not been 
requested; the jury finding i s not contes ted . ) 
The f ina l contract contained the following express provision 
and war r an ty: 
"(1) That there are no l e a k s now e x i s t i n g in the 
basement due to surface or drainage waters.* Addendum 1 
In May 1984 the Lochheads took occupancy of the home. In 
December and January of the fo l lowing winter they claimed to 
experience water percolating into the basement in the middle of 
the bedroom f l o o r . This action was commenced by the Lochheads 
short ly thereaf ter . 
The jury denied the Lochheads claims for breach of contract 
and answered s p e c i f i c interrogatories finding that Mrs. Nelson 
had not breached the c o n t r a c t or w a r r a n t y . See Spec ia l 
Interrogator ies / Addendum 2. 
Mrs. Nelson had counterclaimed for the 1984 property taxes 
because she had paid them and believed that i t was the Lochheads 
re spons ib i l i t y to pay taxes after the contract was entered into 
on October 31/ 1983. 
The court ruled in favor of Mrs. Nelson awarding her $739.56 
for taxes paid. In a separate proceeding the court a lso awarded 
$480.00 attorney's fees for prosecuting the counterclaim. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The appellant argues that a broader meaning should be given 
to the a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s p r o v i s i o n of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. The broader interpretat ion should provide for recovery 
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of attorneyfs fees for successfully defending against a claim of 
default and enforcing the contract. 
This interpretation is more consistent with the entire 
language of the paragraph and gives meaning to the words 
"prevailing party" and the implicit understanding of the parties. 
Such a decision is consistent with prior case law and promotes 
sound public policy. 
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I. 
IT IS THE INTENT OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT TO AWARD THE PREVAILING PARTY REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES NECESSARY TO ENFORCE OR DEFEND AN 
ACTION BASED ON THE CONTRACT TERMS 
The Uniform Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t a t i s s u e in t h i s c a s e 
p r o v i d e s under paragraph 14 as f o l l o w s : 
"14 . A t t o r n e y ' s F e e s . Both p a r t i e s agree t h a t / should 
e i t h e r p a r t y d e f a u l t i n any o f t h e c o v e n a n t s or 
a g r e e m e n t s h e r e i n c o n t a i n e d / the p r e v a i l i n g party in 
l i t i g a t i o n s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to a l l c o s t s and e x p e n s e s , 
inc luding a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e , which may a r i s e 
or accrue from enforc ing or terminat ing t h i s c o n t r a c t / 
or in o b t a i n i n g p o s s e s s i o n of t h e P r o p e r t y / or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by a p p l i c a b l e 
law." 
T h i s c o n t r a c t was a p p r o v e d by t h e Utah R e a l E s t a t e 
Commiss ion f o r u s e by r e a l e s t a t e a g e n t s and b r o k e r s . This 
p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r a c t was f i l l e d - i n a t the d i r e c t i o n of the 
p a r t i e s ' r e a l t o r s by the t i t l e company. The s p e c i f i c language 
q u o t e d a b o v e was n o t d r a f t e d by t h e p a r t i e s or by t h e i r 
a t t o r n e y s . 
The Utah Supreme Court has h e l d t h a t s i m i l a r l a n g u a g e 
p r o v i d e s f o r r e c o v e r y o f a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s f o r s u c c e s s f u l l y 
defending a claim of default* in Swain v« Salt Lake Real Estate 
and Investment C o , . 3 Utah 2d 1 2 1 , 279 P.2d 709 (1955) the c o u r t 
interpreted s imilar language. 
In the Swain case the UREC language was as fo l lows: 
"[4] "The Buyer and Se l l er each agree that should they 
d e f a u l t in any of the c o v e n a n t s and a g r e e m e n t s 
contained h e r e i n , to pay a l l cos t s and expenses that 
may ar i se from enforcing t h i s agreement e i ther by s u i t 
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or otherwise / including a reasonable at torney's f ee ." 
supra at 711* 
In Swain the p l a i n t i f f sought to f o r f e i t the defendant's in teres t 
in land being purchased on contract . The defendant prevailed by 
showing that the p l a i n t i f f had accepted payments and waived i t s 
r i g h t to f o r f e i t u r e . The t r i a l court denied both p a r t i e s 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . The Supreme Court reversed holding that the 
defendant was e n t i t l e d to h i s c o s t s and s t ipulated amount of 
at torney's fees incurred defending the claims and "enforcing the 
agreement"/ a l though to do so he had to prove he was not iri 
d e f a u l t . 
After Swain the UREC attorney's fee provision was modified. 
I n F a u l k n e r v . F a r n s w o r f c h . 714 P . 2d 1149 (Utah 1986) the 
p l a i n t i f f had brought s u i t for s p e c i f i c performance. The 
defendant prevailed enforcing his understanding of the contract 
terms. The court found that the contract res tr i c ted recovery of 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s to payment by the "de fau l t ing p a r t y . " The 
contract provided: 
"The buyer and s e l l e r each agree that should they 
defaul t in any of the covenants or agreements contained 
herein # that [ s i c ] the default ing party s h a l l pay a l l 
c o s t s and expenses/ including a reasonable at torney's 
f e e f which may a r i s e or accrue from enforc ing th i s 
agreement." supra at 1150. (Emphasis added.) 
The court s p e c i f i c a l l y found that "the contractual language 
does not award a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s to the p r e v a i l i n g party who 
succeeds in enforcing the agreement/ but against the default ing 
party whose defaul t n e c e s s i t a t e s enforcement." Faulkner at 1151 
(Emphasis added.) 
- 6 -
At the time of the Faulkner decision, the language of the 
UREC had again been modified by the Real Estate division to the 
form used by the parties in this case. The principle 
modification was to replace "defaulting party" with "prevailing 
party". The additional words "prevailing party" can only have 
additional meaning if the prevailing party need not prove a 
default to prevail, but instead may be vindicated in a claim of 
no default and enforce the contract. 
The addition of this language indicates an intent by the 
drafters to allow recovery of attorney's fees under such 
circumstances. 
In reaching this conclusion, the appellant is not asking the 
court to ignore the other language of the provision. The 
language# "in the event either party shall default#" should be 
read in conjunction with the rest of the provision and be given 
the broader meaning understood by the parties. By doing this the 
court is also giving meaning to the language "prevailing party" 
and "enforce" also found in the provision. 
This broader meaning implicitly includes prevailing against 
claims of default. The initiation of the court action claiming 
default and seeking damages against Nelson is certainly within 
the common understanding of the words "event of default". Had 
the plaintiffs prevailed the effect would have been to reduce the 
contract obligation by the amount of the damages awarded. This 
is not qualitatively different from withholding payment (which 
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may have occurred had there not been a large balance owing). 
Withholding payment i s c l e a r l y an event of d e f a u l t . 
S imi lar ly / as in Swain, the i n i t i a t i o n of s u i t seeking forfe i ture 
i s equiva lent in e f f e c t to refusing to de l iver t i t l e # a d irec t 
act of d e f a u l t . 
The court should find that the language was broadly intended 
to include i n i t i a t i n g l ega l action or making other claims which 
seek to a l t e r the mater ia l e x p e c t a t i o n of the p a r t i e s . Such 
a c t i o n s are e q u i v a l e n t to an event of defaul t for purposes of 
imposing the o b l i g a t i o n to pay a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . Such broad 
interpretat ion i s cons i s t ent with the purpose of at torney's fee 
p r o v i s i o n s as e x p l a i n e d in Management S e r v i c e s . Corp. v . 
Development Assoc ia t e s . 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980) and the common 
understanding of the usual par t i e s to such agreements. 
Th i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l s o most d i r e c t l y c o r r e c t s the 
imbalance that otherwise e x i s t s when one party claims default but 
i s proven wrong. The prevai l ing party should not be penalized 
(by being dragged into court and incurring fees and expenses in 
defending a fr ivolous claim)$ but should receive her contractual 
e x p e c t a t i o n s from "enforcing" the contract including recovering 
at torney's fees incurred in doing s o . 
Almost ident i ca l language has been interpreted in Brewer v. 
Tehuacana Venture. L td , . 737 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.App. 1987) . In that 
case a l imited partner sued the Limited Partnership and general 
par tners for an accounting and damages. Attorney's fees were 
governed by the following language. 
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"In the event e i ther party hereto s h a l l defaul t upon 
h i s c o v e n a n t s and agreements h e r e i n , then the 
prevail ing party hereto s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to reasonable 
attorney's fees for the enforcement of same." supra at 
353. 
As in th i s case the jury found no fa i lure to d i s c l o s e and no 
w i l l f u l b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t , t h u s , there was "no d e f a u l t " . 
Nevertheless , the court awarded the defendant attorney's fees as 
the prevai l ing party. The appellant court affirmed. 
A f t e r t h e Utah R e a l E s t a t e Commission removed the 
r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s o n l y be charged to the 
d e f a u l t i n g party as i n t e r p r e t e d in Faulkner . the UREC more 
c l o s e l y resembled the form interpreted by the Court in SitaiH# 
supra. As was done in S^aiHr the court should reverse the t r i a l 
court and recognize the broad intent of the contract to allow the 
p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y to r e c o v e r the c o s t s of e n f o r c i n g her 
expectat ions under the contract . 
I I . 
FORM CONTRACTS ADOPTED BY PUBLIC ENTITIES FOR 
NON-ATTORNEYS REQUIRE FAIR AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE PARTIES RELYING ON THEIR LANGUAGE PROVIDED 
The purpose of an attorney's fees provision was explained by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Management Services. Corp.. supra 
quoting Zambruk v. Perlmutter Third General Builders, Inc. 510 
P.2d 472 (Colo.App. 1973) that: 
"The purpose of a provision for attorney's fees is to 
indemnify the creditor or the prevailing party against 
the necessity of paying an attorney's fee and to enable 
him to recover the full amount of the obligation." 
supra at 409. 
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In this case the prevailing party is not indemnified! but 
has been put to the cost of an expensive suit although her 
expectation under the contract has been vindicated by the jury's 
finding. She has not recovered "the full amount of the 
obligation". 
The unfairness of this position was noted recently in the 
concurring opinion of J. Zimmerman in Ouealy v. Anderson, 27 Utah 
Adv. Rep 24 (Utah 1988). The court found the recovery of 
attorney's fees to be barred by an accord and satisfaction. 
However, J. Zimmerman in his concurring opinion notes: 
"If one party attempts to enforce the agreement/ but 
the other party successfully defends by showing that 
the contract no longer is in force because of an accord 
and satisfaction or a recisionf the defendant cannot 
recover his attorney fees. Yet if the plaintiff is 
successful in his suit/ he can recover his fees. This 
gives the plaintiff a monetary advantage in bargaining 
and in any suit. 
Although the record is silent on the matter/ there is 
no reason to believe that if the parties to the 
contract before us had considered the issuer they would 
have written it -to produce the result reached by the 
Court. Similarly/ I suspect that laymen who routinely 
enter into these standard form contracts with no legal 
advice assume that the attorney fee provision means 
that if any litigation arises out of the contract/ the 
prevailing party will be awarded his attorney fees. 
This would not be an unreasonable assumption to one 
unfamiliar with the intricacies of the law. Yet I 
recognize that absent some other evidence of intent/ 
the language of the contract/ when read in light of the 
abstruse doctrines of accord and satisfaction or 
recision, does require the result reached by the 
majority. And I can see no way for this Court to 
remedy the problem without doing undue violence to the 
legal doctrines involved." supra at 27. 
Chief Justice Hall in his dissent goes further: 
"The provision for attorney fees is contained in a 
preprinted document denominated as a "Uniform Real 
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Estate Contract" which is in general use in this 
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argue the provision creates a 
right to attorney fees only for enforcing the contract 
or a right arising from breach of the contract against 
the defaulting party. Thus, under plaintiffs' 
interpretation, defendants would be entitled to 
attorney fees only if they brought an action against 
the plaintiffs in the event of plaintiffs' default. 
Relying on our recent decision in White v. Fox.10 
plaintiffs assert that defendants, not having bargained 
for an express contractual right to attorney fees 
incurred in defending a lawsuit on the contract, have 
no legal basis for claiming such fees. 
Plaintiffs' construction of the attorney fees provision 
is unreasonably narrow and contrary to the intent 
behind the provision. Unlike the provision at issue in 
White, the provision in this case, even under 
plaintiffs' interpretation, applies to both parties to 
the contract. In White. we held that where the parties 
had equal bargaining power an agreement by one party to 
pay attorney fees could not be read to impose a 
reciprocal duty on the other party. * In this case, by 
the terms of the provision itself, the duty to pay 
attorney fees is reciprocal, and the issue is whether 
the duty includes liability for fees incurred by either 
party in successfully defending an action on the 
contract. I think it does. In successfully asserting 
that their contractual duty to buy the property had 
been excused, defendants in effect enforced their 
contractual rights. Thus, payment of their attorney 
fees by plaintiffs was required by the contract 
provision. 
Moreover, the intent behind an attorney fees provision 
is to protect the party in whose favor the provision 
runs (in this case both parties) from the costs of 
litigation in the event such protection is warranted, 
i.e., in the event that the party prevails. This 
intent is fostered by requiring payment of attorney 
fees, regardless of which party initiated the lawsuit. 
To limit the award of attorney fees to the party 
commencing the action in no way advances the purpose of 
an attorney fees provision. Rather, it serves the 
counterproductive end of penalizing one who is the 
target of an unsuccessful lawsuit on the contract. 
Thus, the more reasonable interpretation of the 
contract provision is that which provides for an award 
of attorney fees to the prevailing party in litigation 
on the contract, regardless of whether that party 
initiated the lawsuit." supra at White v. Fox . 665 P.2d 
1297 (Utah 1983). 
-11-
This case is much easier than Ouealy and the reasoning cited 
above more directly applicable. This is not a case where 
recovery is based upon theories outside the contract as in 
Quealy. Here the essence of the contract was in dispute. 
This contract was not drafted by either party but by a state 
agency for use by the public. The provision of public policy 
expressed in Management Services, and Ouealy should particularly 
apply. Thus, the provisions should be even-handed, should not 
create an unfair advantage and should, to the degree possible, 
protect the expectation of recovering the full amount of the 
obligation by the prevailing party. 
CONCESSION 
The intent of changing "defaulting party" to "prevailing 
party" was to equalize the protection of both parties and to give 
full protection to the parties1 expectations. To interpret the 
contract as done by the trial court is to frustrate this intent 
and to create a contract contrary to public policy. The court 
should reverse the trial court and remand for a determination of 
the reasonable attorney's fees necessary to defend this action 
and prosecute this appeal or award such fees as appear proper 
based on the record• 
RESPECTIVELY submitted this day of November, 1988. 
Steven F. Alder 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
-12-
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
C A U T I O N : R E A D B E F O R E Y O U S I G N 
(1) This is a legally binding contract: if you do not understand it. seek legal advice before you sign. 
(21 This contract is intended to be filled in by lawyers or real estate brokers. All others seek professional advice. 
(3) To assure protection of certain priority rights in the Property, recordation of this contract and any assignments, addenda, or 
legally sufficient notices of interest is highly recommended. 
1. Parties. This contract, made and entered into this 3 1 S t day of O c t o b e r \9 8 3 j s by a n ( j between G E R A L D I N E 
R E T C F P P V * rtF.P&r.nTMF B A K F t t N F T . S O N 
(hereafter collectively called "Seller"), whose address is 
a„H PAUL R. LOCKHEAD and PENNY LOCHHEAD, husband and wife, as joint tenants 
(hereafter collectively called "Buyer"), whose address is 
2. Property. Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy the real prooerty (the "Property") located at 5 9 5 E a s t 5 9 0 0 
S O H t f r 1 (street address), in the City of M n v-T? V County of 5 ? L l t L a k e 
State of Utah, described as: 
All of Lot 49, EREXSON DAIRY SUBDIVISION, according to the official 
plat thereof on file and of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office. 
Together with all personal property as described in that certain 
Listing Card #12574 plus all fireplace screens and accessories 
3. Date of Possession. Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of the Property ***•**— -4*7 w 
** no later than August 31, 1984, 
4. Price and Payment. Buyer agrees to pay for the Property the purchase price of O N E H U N D R E D F I F T Y TWO T H O U S A N D 
A t t n M O / 1 OH - nniiar* ($ 1 5 2 , 0 0 0 ) payable at Seller s address above given. 
or to Seller's order, on the following terms: T W Z * 1 T V F O U R T H O U S A N D F I V E 5 7 N D R S D S I X T Y AMD N O / 1 0 0 
Oollars ($ 2 4 , 5 6 0 . 0 Q i n ^ n payment, receipt of which is hereoy acknowledged, and the balance of O M F H U N D P F F ) T W 7 . M T Y — 
SSVSN ?OUR KUS1DRSD FORTY DOLLARS AND no/100 0<>"*'s t* 1 7 7 , ^ D . ) be.ng pa.d as follows: 
The sum of $1,240.15 shall be paid to Seller 30 days after Buyer 
takes possession of the subject property, and the sum of $1,240.15 
shall be paid to Seller on before the same day of each succeeding 
month thereafter, until the total unpaid principal balance together 
with interest accrued thereon at the rate of Eleven Percent (11%) 
per annum is paid in full. 
It is understood and agreed that Buyer shall take possession of the 
subject property no later than August 31, 1984 and the monthly pay-
ments to the Seller shall commence no later than October 1, 1984. 
It is understood and agreed that Buyer may make additional balloon 
payments for reduction of the principal balance. Any such payments 
greater than $4,500.00 will reflect in a recast of payments based 
on the reduced principal balance as an incentive for paying off the 
contract earlv. 
CD 
Cn 
O 
CO 
o 
This form is approved by tha utan Real Estate Commission. 
ADDENDUM 1 
Payments shall include interest at the rate of E .1 e v e n percent U _ H _ % ) per annum on the unpaid balance from the d^ie of 
p Q S . S - f i S S l O n ,— Any payment not made within f 2 ?t P g n ( 1 5 - ? days of its due date shall subject Buyer to a fate payment charge of 
F J V C P € f c e m ( 5 %) of such overdue payment, which charge must be paid before receiving credit for the late payment The foregoing 
paymentsO include 2 do not include a reserve for payment of fire insurance premiums Initially the reserve amouni per payment is s r> / ^ \n 
the event reserve payments in underlying obligations for taxes and/or insurance premiums for the Property change. Seller shall give Buyer thirty (30) 
days written notice of change, and reserve payments herein shall be adjusted accordingly 
AH payments made by Buyer shall be applied first to payment of late charges, next to Seller s payments under Section 12 with interest as provided 
therein, next to the payment of reserves if any. next to the payment of interest, and then to the reduction of principal Buyer may. at Buyer s option pay 
amounts in excess of the periodic payments herein provided, and such excess shall be applied to unpaid principal unless Buyer elects in writing at ihe 
time of such payment that it shall be applied as prepayment of future installments. 
From and after the time that the unpaid principal balance is equal to or less than the total balance outstanding on the underlying obligations 
reitrrtd to in Section 7 below, all payments received shall be distributed by Seller in a manner which will retire such underlying obligations either on or 
before the date of final payment under this contract In the event of any prepayment. Buyer shall assume and pay all penalties incurred by Seller m 
making accelerated payments on any underlying obligations 
5. No Waiver. If Seller accepts payments from Buyer on this contract in an amount less than or at a time later than herein provided such 
acceptance will not constitute a modification of this contract or a waiver of Seller s rights to full and timely future performance by Buyer 
6. Evidence of Title. Seller has. at his expense, furnished Buyer evidence of title in the form of O an up-to-date abstract of title together with a 
current attorney s opinion Ctan owner s title insurance policy insuring Buyer s interest in the Property under this contract for the amount of the 
purchase price 
7. Underlying Obligations. Seller warrants that the only underlying obligations against the Property are 
(a) obligation in favor of F i r s t - T n t P r s f - . a f - P ft^nfr
 B 
-L... , .• .„ -—?^-r^—**9**i4.* v .4~—5r-= — w , , n a n unpaid principal balance of 
T H I R T Y ^ i X THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED ONE AND 8 9 / 1 0 0 ^ ^ - —
 0 o l U r , 
( 3 6 , P H I . fl9 ) as of 0 r ~ 1 19 £ 3 _ with momhly paymenis of S A 4 5 n 0 wiih interest at N i n p & O n e H a ] 
percent ( 9 - ^ %) P«' annum and balloon payments as follows 
(b) obligation in favor of B . H. McSWEN a n d VTOLA MrFWEN 
with an unpaid principal balance of 
FORTY TWO FOUR HUNDRED AND NO/TOO Ooiiars 
(S 4 ? 4 H H 0 0 ) as of - U C t o h f - 7 1 1 ) 9 . 8 3 - - with monthly payments of S. 2 9 5 » 47 with interest at c p y p n 
percent ( _ ? * , per annum and balloon payments as follows. D u e i n f u l l V / n e n S e l l e r s e c u i t y I S p a i d 
i n f u l l . 
Copies of such underlying obligations have been delivered to and reviewed by Buyer Such underlying obligations f X] contain ( ] do not contain 
"due on sale * or "due on encumbrance ' provisions In the event that the Holder or Mortgagee of any underlying obligations is entitled to a remedy 
pursuant to a due on sale, non-alienation, or non-assumption provision as a result of the execution of this contract and/or any documents) related 
hereto, the entire unpaid balance owed hereunder, without further notice shall become immediately due and payable thirty (30) days following written 
notice to Buyer of the intent of any Holder or Mortgagee to exercise any such remedy 
8 Covenant Again** Liens. ^ M > » ^ i * M ^ ^ - * « * - * * * J ^ » c ^ » ^ » r ^ ^ U s * e 4 ^ r ^ ^ 
and cio&^U jJUU^n* 3^+^\*rf&^t^&&M*^wa*Gis~&~$Ai}4** So long as Buyer is current hereunder Seller agrees to keeo current me payments 
on all ooligations to which 8uyer s interest is suoordinate Should Seller default on the foregoing covenants on any one or more occasions 8uyer 
may. at Buyer s option in wnoie or in pan. make good Seller s default to Seller $ obligee and deduct ail expenditures so paid from future payments to 
Seller and Seller shall credit all 8uyer s sums so expended to the indebtedness herein created just as if payment hao betn made directly to Seller under 
the provisions of Section 4 above 
9. Risk oi Loss. Prorations. All risk of loss, destruction of the Property, and expenses of insurance shall be borne by Seller until tne agreed date 
of possession, at which time property taxes, assessments, rents, insurance, and other expenses of the Property shall be prorated 
10. Taxes and Assessments. Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind which become due on the Property during the life of 
this contract Seller covenants that there are no taxes, assessments, or dens against the Property not mentioned elsewnere herein except 
t-.axgci t j h i r h aro a r r m i n g fnr frhs y e a r IQft^ and monthly assfifiSTnpn+-<* rhargpr i 
by Murray City — — — —wn,cn W|U °* oa,d Dv <-, 
Seller during which time Sailors hac poccescion of the subject property * g 
1 1 . Insurance. On and after the-a^r 4?»aT?«T? -ffioi?r.^s7^a. Buyer shall maintain at Buyer's expense, the following insurance policies naming C/1 
the Seller as *n additional insured: (i) insurance against loss by fire and other risks customarily covered by "All Risk" insurance on insurable Cf\ 
buildings 'and improvements at replacement value of 80% as a "Replacement Cause** endorsement 'sh^it designate, ind (fi) general liability £ ~ 
insurance having coverage of not less then the greater of s) 00.000 or * 1 ? 7 ., 4 4 fl .  eo<nftm<d single limit with a certificate of insurance provided *•*• 
to Seller that includes a ten() 0) day nonce of cancellation in favor of Seller All such insurance policies snail be in companies which are duly licensed ~ 
by the State o< Utah and are acceptable to Seller. Acceptance of such companies by Seller may not be unreasonably withheld. ZZ 
K 
) 2. Seller's Option to Oischerge Obligations. In the event 8uyer shall default in the payment of any taxes, assessments insurance premiums ^ j 
or other expenses of the eroperty. Seller may. at Seller's option, pay said taxes, assessments, insurance'pramiums
 0r other expenses..and if Seller £ 
elects so to do. Buyer agrees to repay Seller upon demand all such sums so advanced and paid by Seller tooether with interest thereon irom date of CZ 
payment of said sums at the rate of the greater of one and one-half percent {) !6%) or 1 » 5 percent (1 > 5 %) per month until paid, and when 
the principal sum provided in this contract is paid, if Buyer fails to also repay Seller such advances. Seller may refuse to convey title to the Property until 
such repayment is made. 
13 No Waste Buyer agrees that Buyer will neither commit nor suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon the Property 
which wouiJ impair Seller's security and that Buyer will maintain the Property in good condition 
T4 Attorney's Pees. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained the 
prevailing party in litigation shall be entitled to all costs and expenses including a reasonable attorney s fee which may arise or accrue from enforcing 
or terminating this contract, or m obtaining possession of the Property, or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law 
15 Binding Effect. This contract is binding on the heirs executors administrators personal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
respective parties hereto 
16 Buyer's Default. Should Buyer fail to comply with any of the terms hereof, Seller shall give Buyer written notice specifically setting forth 
the provisions under which Buyer is in default Should Buyer fail to cure such default within . T ^ n ( LQ Idays but not less than ten (10) 
days after said notice. Seller may. in addition to any other remedies afforded Seller by law. elect any of the following remedies. 
A Seller may be released from all obligations in law and equity to convey the Property, and Buyer shall become at once a tenant at will of 
Seller All payments which have been made by 8uyer theretofore under this contract shall be retained by Seller as liquidated and agreed 
damages for breach of the contract, provided however, that should payments of principal exceed twenty percent (20%) of the purchase 
price plus Seller s accrued interest, unreimbursed expenses under Section 10 and Section 12 fair rental value, and a reasonable 
attorney's fee. then and in that event, such excess shall be refunded to Buyer This remedy shall not be available to Seller from and after 
the time Buyer shall have paid to Seller thirty-three and one-third percent (33 1/3%) or more of the purchase price; or 
B Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments and all reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, and the use of 
this remedy on one or more occasions shall rot prevent Seller at Seller s option from resorting to this or any other available remedy in 
the case of subsequent default, or 
C Seller may, upon written notice to Buyer, declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest hereunder at once due and 
payable and may elect to treat this contract as a note secured by a deed of trust, with Escrow Agent (hereafter named) as Trustee with 
power of sale thereunder and without requirement to tender legal title to Buyer, proceed immediately to foreclose in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah applicable to trust deeds 
17 Escrow Simultaneously with the execution of this contract Seller shall execute a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying title to the 
Property to 8uyer. and Buyer shall execute a good and sufficient quit claim deed to the Property in favor of Escrow Agent (hereafter named) as Trustee 
Both deeds, together with a copy of this contract and such further instructions as shall be deemed necessary or convenient to carry out this contract, 
shall be deposited forthwith with . associ-aT^n TTTT.F- COMPANY 
(a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association savings and loan association or insurance company authorized to do such 
business in Utah a corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in 
Utah or a U S Government Agency) whose address «s .8 1 1 E 4JQ.Q Sn
 f ^ T . P f f H - ^ h Pj 4 1_ 0 3h«reaf f r called "Escrow Agent ) 
who shall hold said documents during Buyer's performance of this contract and shall deliver the same to Buyer upon completion of Buyer s obligation 
hereunder, or to Seller together with a Trustee s Oeed in favor of Seller upon the expiration of thirty (30) days after Seller shall have notified Escrow 
Agent and 8uyer. by sworn statement, at the above-given addresses by certified or registered mail that Buyer has defaulted and failed to cure such 
default, and Seller has elected the remedy in Section 16A, in accordance with the provisions of this contract Costs of establishing and maintaining the 
escrow shall be borne equally 
18 Assignment, tn the event Buyer or any assignee of Buyer assigns this contract. Buyer or such assignee shall, at the time of said 
assignment, deposit with Escrow Agent a good and sufficient special warranty deed in favor of the assignee, and said deed shall be held and delivered 
by Escrow Agent along with and under the same conditions as the deeds deposited originally with Escrow Agent. In the event Seller assigns or 
transfers his interest in the Property to a third-party, at the time of sucn transfer. Seller shall deposit into escrow a special warranty deed from the 
third-party to Buyer 
19 Time of Essence. It is expressly agreed that time is of the essence in this contract. 
20 Warranties of Physical Condition. With respect to the physical condition of the Property Seller warrants the following: 
m T h ^ r f h p r p * r P n o I P ^ V S n o w p v i s t - m g i n M I P h ^ e m p n t - rfnp +-r> c m r - g o e 
or riramagp waf o rs _ _ _ 
(-2J That Seller will ^enlace hrnVen glass in basement windows, 
2 1 . Captions. Section captions shall not in any way limit modify, or *lto the provisions in the section. 
22. Entire Agreement This contract contains the entire agreement between the panics hereto. Any provisions hereof not enforceable under 
the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect the validity of any other provisions hereof. 
23. r**+. P , ^ . . - ^ . ( I ) q p l l p r i s g i y p n r h e n n f - i n t ) f p C C C U r ^ * n r * ™ « i n + * * " T ^ * n c — 
< ; p r " T r a r i S y S 3 J ^ p r ^ p ^ ^ ^ y n? *nt- *-r\ a v r o o H f - ^ p f - ^ a n n n p . v ^ r^pt-yin*- ^ a h r r a . 
heraunc?ar~ payable in regular monthly installments; ^rwided that tho 
a g C " ? * ^ Tchthly inst?liner,4: r?,,f*^ ,ef,"s required ts ba niada bv the Sailor 
O n S P ' f * l ^ n g c h * 1 1 n n h hex r - a a f o r + - S * n A ^ r h m c i - ^ l n i a n f p * y r t p n t » r a n n ^ 
r o h p T I ^ H P h v i-^cx R n v o r nnrt&r r h i c . r o n t ' ^ ^ r f ( 2 ) ^ ^ ^ ^ * g ~ 9 e < i *!*? \ ? * ~ a ^ 
supnecr. propp^f-.y from buyer for a pgrvod of np fro a.ngnsf IT, IQQd »+- M P ra 
$3 00 . 00 ner month, Seller tc ^ay any, incraago in taxas and insnr^nr* dn-in 
this lsaGa scried as an inrra*s? in ~he r^nt (-3J T ^ ^ r y p T . i s ^ome ar i<pfi., 
Snrir.a ^Mr> t)r-iv* c o l i c * n H r ^ n c / a c : ^ i nr- *nrpi^ + ^ f 1 Q p 4 , S ^ l l g r W i l l I TT l fTa f ra 
the subjec t property v i t h m 30 dav£ on r e c e i p t o f ' ^ . t t a n nor i P P . 
( S e p . a d f l p n H n T n * r + a r h e d h p > - o 4 - n a n d h v f - h i c rexfgy-armc* T T ^ H P a n * T - + h^ronr 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their signatures on the day and year first above written. 
JLKOL 
STATE OF UTAH ^SV: . . , . * / • . - . >"-:-.• ••• / . - • > % , ' i * f '•• s$ COUNTYpg'Sait- Lake , 
a k a ^ V a ^ ^ V l Y e r 8§t§&S r •19aJL-pcrsona , ,vappearedb€ fo remc ^ r a l d i n e Raker 
Seller and signer .of the aoove instrument, wno duly acknowleged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commissjerr.Expires: *"* . ; * / . NOTArtTTUBUC 
'^y^'£-3 ^$7 Residing at/ ^.C-C* CC&£ 
STATE OF UTAH 
V j . \ > '•
 m-. ss. 
co'uisrTy OF "'Salt" Lake 
;"' ^ / ^ , - . p n t h e , — 3 T - S t l d a y o f O r f o h p r 19 _fL3L personally appeared before me P a n l P . T . n r h h ^ ^ H 
, Su'yer ah*d signer of the above instrument, wno duly acknowleged to me that he executed the s a m e a n d P e n n y L O c H h e a d 
:
- '•• " <-' •> -; ~ •• - • •• \^<2€iu~ ^p£x^J^6Jh> 
My Commission Expires:" " * NOTARY PUBLIC / " V * = = * 
-. «.-^ 8-1-9-87 Residing at: C ^ S a l t Lake County , Utah 
* " * . 
STATE OF UTAH ~""~ 
ss. 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of 19 , personally appeared before me 
who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the {title] of 
a corporation of the State of and Seller in the above instrument, and that the above instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of its bylaws/a resolution oi us^board of directors (strike where inapplicable) and said - - -
du<y acknowledged to me that-said corporation- executed the same. •' 
My Commission Expires: NOTARY PUBUC 
Residing at: 
STATrOF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the _ _ _ _ d a y of . 19 personally appeared before me — _ . 
who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the (title) of — . . 
a corporation of the State of
 r _ ^ _ a n d Buyer m j h e j b o v * instrument, and that the above instrument was signed in behalf of said g 
corporation by authority of its bylaws/a resolution of its board of directors (strike where inapplicable) and said , r4 
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. ~ ^ 
en 
O 
- CO My Commission Expires: NOTARY PU8UC 
Residing at: ~~ 
O 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL R. LOCHHEAD and PENNY 
LOCHHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GERALDINE BAKER NELSON, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. C86-506 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Please answer the following questions by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you find that the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, 
answer the question MyesM. If on any issue you find that 
the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot 
determine from the preponderance of the evidence, or if 
you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue 
presented, answer the question MNoM. 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did the parties intend that the 
language of the contract apply to the water problems 
experienced by the Lochheads? 
Yes / 
No 
( 
fit 
-> 
/ 
/A _ J- /In no 
- i -
Kaq fa /b /Jo 
ADDENDUM 2 
QUESTION NO. 2: Was there a breach of the contract 
or warranty by Mrs. Nel9on? 
Yes 
NO _ ^ f 
If you have answered yes to questions numbered 1 and 
2 answer question 3. 
QUESTION NO. 3: What are the reasonable damages 
experienced by the Lochheads? 
$ 
Dated and returned to court this day of April, 
1988. 
FOREMAN 
-2-
F ! L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
rixts «ooo 
Paul R. Lochhead and Penny 
Lochhead, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Geraldine Baker Nelson, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
V 
UN-
ORDER 
Case No. 880508-CA 
4 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson and Orme (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31, Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the judgment of the trial court 
denying an award of attorneys' fees to Geraldine Baker Nelson 
(Case No. 880508-CA) is affirmed, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the judgment of the trial court 
on Geraldine Baker Nelson's counterclaim for taxes (Case No. 
880568-CA) is affirmed. 
DATED this / I?2*day of April, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of April, 1989, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the 
following: 
Steven F. Alder 
Cheryl M. Brower 
Attorneys at Law 
220 East 3900 South #16 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Robert H. Wilde 
Attorney at Law 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
#C86-506 
\ 
Julia C. Whitfield 
Case Management Clerk 
